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PERSONAL SERVICE IN A FOREIGN STATE IN
DIVORCE ACTIONS IN INDIANA
Is personal service in a foreign state available against nonresident defendants in divorce actions in Indiana as a substitute
for notice by publication in a weekly newspaper?
Our Indiana Code containes a general provision providing
that when the defendant is a nonresident in certain actions, expressly including actions to obtain a divorce, "The clerk * * *
shall cause a notice of the pendency of any action, and the term
at which the same will stand for trial, to be published for three
weeks successively, in some newspaper of general circulation
Following this section, and as a part of our code
*
*
."
there is a general provision as follows: "When the defendant
is a non-resident, personal service of the summons out of the
state is equivalent to publication * * *2 and further providing that such service may be proved by competent affidavits
as therein set forth. It was apparently the intention of the
legislature in enacting the latter provision, as a part of the
code, to make it applicable to all actions coming within the
provisions of the first section above given.
Our latest divorce act 3 provides as follows: "If it shall appear by affidavit of a disinterested person that the defendant
is not a resident of this state, or that residence of the defendant,
upon diligent inquiry, is unknown, the clerk shall give notice of
the penidency of such petition by publication4 for three consecutive weeks in some weekly newspaper of general circulation
*
* * in case such affidavit state the residence of the defendant, the clerk shall forward by mail, to such defendant the number of the paper containing such notice, with the notice
marked." It is apparent upon reading this act that the pro1Burns' Ann. Statutes, 1926, Vol. 1, Sec. 338.
2 Burns', 1926, Sec. 339.
%Acts 1929, p. 575; Burns', Vol. 4, Sec. 1100.
4 Our

italics.
t Our italics. This 1929 act amended Acts of 1879, special session, p.
124, Burns, 1926, Vol. 1, Sec. 1100, and repealed all parts of the former act
in conflict therewith, but that part of the later act as above set out is not
materially different from the former act.
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vision requiring the clerk to publish a notice of the divorce petition is mandatory, and that, in case the residence of the defendant is known and shown by affidavit, the legislature intended
that the defendant receive actual notice of the pendency of the
cause by receiving, through the mail, a copy of the newspaper
containing the notice, with the notice marked, and not by receiving a summons. It is submitted that there is thereby provided,
in the divorce act, a certain definite procedure to be followed
when the defendant in a divorce action is a nonresident of the
state.
The question then arises: does the general code provision
providing that personal service out of the state is equivalent
to notice by publication apply in actions for divorce in which
the defendant is a nonresident, thus offering an alternative
method by which constructive service may be had upon which
a valid decree of divorce can be rendered? Probaby cases in
which this question is involved infrequehitly arise in most jurisdictions in Indiana. However, the writer has been confronted
with several such cases while representing the state in default
divorce matters, with the result that the plaintiff, at added
expense and time, has obtained service by publication. In addition to the material question of the jurisdiction of the court, the
plaintiff should be concerned with the property rights involved
in divorce actions, and his rights and status in case he remarries
after having obtained a decree based upon such service.
So far as can be ascertained, no case involving this particular
point has been decided by our appellate courts. There is a line
of cases, however, involving analogous propositions of law, which
apparently answer this question in the negative. The case of
Powell v. Powell6 was an action to vacate and set aside a divorce
decree previously granted. In the prior action, an affidavit for
a change of venue from the judge, based upon the code provisions for such change, was properly filed and the change
granted, after which a divorce decree was rendered. In the
instant case the contention was made that divorce proceedings
are special, hence the code provisions relative to a change from
the judge did not apply, with the result that the divorce decree
rendered by the special judge was null and void. The Supreme
Court held that the code provisions did apply, the change from
the judge was properly granted, and the divorce decree thereafter rendered was valid, saying: "*
* * we think that a
6 104 Ind. 18.
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proceeding for a divorce is, at least, in such a sense and to such
an extent a civil action, that the provision of the civil code for
changing the venue on account of the bias and prejudice of the
judge is applicable." The court then discussed the question of
whether divorce is a special proceeding wholly without the
code provisions, and after citing various authorities continued:
"They (the cases cited) do not hold that such a case is wholly a
special proceeding; nor do they hold that it is in no sense a
civil action under the code. They do hold, and correctly, that
where the procedure is prescribedin the divorce act, that should
be pursued, and not the civil code ;7 and that so far as a procedure
is provided in that act, it may be called a special proceeding.
They further hold that where it is apparent thit the legislature
intended that certain sections of the civil code should not apply
in divorce cases, they will not be so applied, and especially, if
the result would be to open the decree." The court then based
its decision on the fact that the divorce act was silent on -the
question of a change from the judge, and that the legislature
must have intended that the code provisions on that point should
apply in divorce actions.
The Powell case supra was cited and followed in the case of
Evans v. Evanss to the effect that "* * * where the procedure is prescribed in the divorce act, that should be pursued,
and not the civil code." In the latter case, the Supreme Court
held, on like reasoning, that a change of venue from the county,
based on the code provisions for such change, was available in
divorce actions.
In the case of Simons v. Simons9 the Supreme Court again
cited and followed the Powell case supra, saying: "* * * * *
where special provisions are contained in the statute regulating
proceedings in divorce cases, they will govern, although different
from the rules which obtain in ordinary civil actions." Here
the Supreme Court held that interrogatories could not be used
in divorce actions, the divorce statute containing such provisions
as make the use of interrogatories improper in such actions,
citing Barr v. Barr 0 to that effect.
The tendency and desire of our courts is to treat all cases
except criminal cases as civil actions, within the meaning of
7 Our italics.

8 105 Ind. 204 at p. 205.

9 107 Ind. 197.
10 31 Ind. 240.
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those terms as used in our code, except actions based on special
statutes which contain special provisions to the contrary, as
shown by the case of Indiana State Board etc. v. Davis.'" Here
the Powell case supra was again cited to the proposition that
*

"*

*

the Civil Code is applicable to proceedings brought

under special statutes, except where such statues provide their
own procedure or exclude the Civil Code." And again in the
case of Eikenbury v. Eikenbury,12 a divorce action in which the
Powell case was cited and followed, the court said: "And because marriage is declared to be a civil contract, it does not
follow that a suit for divorce should be considered in the light
of a civil action merely. It is a civil action in so far as the
divorce act in itself fails to prescribe rules of procedure. If
the divorce act is to be made effective, resort must be had to the
civil code. But in so far only as recourse must 3 be had to the
rules of civil procedure is it a civil action."
Thus it is submitted that our divorce act provides a certain
definite procedure for obtaining service on a nonresident defendant in divorce actions by publication; that, such a procedure being given in the divorce act, under the rule announced
by our appellate courts in analagous cases, as here given, the
general code provisions that personal service out of the state
is equivalent to publication does not apply in divorce actions,
and that no valid decree of divorce can be rendered upon such
constructive service.
Probably no one would contend that such should be the law.
The purpose of publication is to give the court jurisdiction and
to let the defendant know that such an action is pending against
him. The court could be given jurisdiction by statute in cases
where such personal service out of the state might be had, and
if such service was available, the defendant would actually learn
of the case. The provision that the clerk shall mail the defendant a copy of the paper containing the notice is not always complied with, and even if it is mailed, he may never receive it. The
cost of such personal service would also be materially less than
notice by.publication. And finally, under our statutes 14 a defendant against whom a judgment of divorce has been rendered
without other notice than publication in a newspaper may have
11 69 Ind. App. 109.

33 Ind. App. 69.
'Z-Our italics.
14 Burns 1926, Vol. 1, Sec. 1116.
12
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the judgment opened at any time within two years after the
rendition of the judgment so far as relates to his defense to the
granting of the decree, the allowance of alimony, and the disposition of property, upon his filing an affidavit that during the
pendency of the action he received no actual notice thereof in
time to appear in court at the time of the trial and object to the
judgment. If it were possible to serve him personally in another state, he could not then say he had no actual notice of the
petition, and could not then have the decree opened on that
ground.
BASIL B. CLARK.
Of the Gary Bar.

